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ABSTRACT 
We investigate experimentally a two-person infinitely repeated game of 
incomplete information. In the stage game, each player chooses to give in or 
hold out .  Players have privately known costs of giving in and each player 
receives a fixed benefit whenever at least one player gives in. High cost 
players have a dominant strategy in the stage game to hold out ,  and the low 
cost players ' best response depends on what the opponent does. Equilibrium 
play t.o the infinitely repeated game conveys information about the players 
type. 
We investigate two questions: whether there is any evidence that subject 
behavior approximates belief stationary equilibria, and whether there is
evidence that subjects will converge to an equilibrium of the correct state. We 
conclude that subjects do not adopt symmetric belief stationary strategies for 
the holdout game. However, we cannot reject the hypotheses that subjects 
converge towards eventually playing an equilibrium of the correct state (even 
though they do not always learn the correct state). Behavior of experienced 
subjects is closer to the predictions of symmetric belief-stationary equilibrium. 
The Holdout Game: 
An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated 
Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates a two-person infinitely repeated game of incomplete 
information, in which each player has private information on his/her type before the 
first game is played, and this is followed by a infinite sequence of identical 
simultaneous-move stage games. Players observe their own payoff and the other 
player's move after each stage game has been played. Payoffs in the game are given by 
the discounted sum of payoffs in all the stage games. 
The information structure is that each player knows his/her own type, but only 
the distribution from which the other player's type was drawn. The types of the two 
play('rs are drawn independently, and each player's payoff function in the stage game is 
determined solely by his/her own type. Thus it is what is sometimes referred to as an 
independent private values situation.
Games of this sort fall in a class of games that have been studied in a recent 
collection of papers by Kalai and Lehrer (1991), Jordan ( 199la, 1991b, 1992), McKelvey 
and Palfrey ( 1992 ). Jordan (1991b) establishes the existence of a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game and Kalai and Lehrer ( 1991 )  and Jordan 
( 1991 b) prove that in every Bayesian Nash equilibrium, eventuaily the sequence of play 
along the equilibrium path will be empirically indistinguishable from play that could 
have arisen at some Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game in which the 
actual draws of the two players were common knowledge. In other words, enough 
information is leaked in the early rounds of play so that play eventually mimics an 
equilibrium as if the players' types have been perfectly revealed. The "as if" caveat is 
relevant; the theorems do not imply that players.., �be1iefs about each other's type 
converges to complete information (i .e. to a degenerate posterior at the true type) .  
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As interesting as these theorems are,- other ..xesults .from the--folk theorem 
literature suggest that they place few restrictions on the possible patterns of equilibrium 
play. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) propose a stationarity requirement which imposes 
very strong restrictions on the equilibrium play. This is called belief-stationarity and
requires that the behavioral· strategies at a given stage can depend on history only to 
the extent that different histories lead to different common knowledge beliefs about 
player types. In other words, if players have common knowledge beliefs 7r at stage t and 
7r at stage t', then each player must be mixing over his or her actions with the same
probability distribution at stage t' as at stage t. In that paper, they also show that even
with such a stationarity restriction, equilibrium play along some paths may be very 
complicated, exhibiting a rich nonlinear dynamic in which the trajectory of beliefs along 
such a path is chaotic . 
Nonetheless, in some games, belief stationarity leads to the selection of a unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, the motivation for this refinement is in much the 
same spirit as the restrictions on equilibrium imposed in much of the bargaining 
literature with complete information, following Rubinstein ( 1982). There one also finds 
that stationarity (of a different sort) selects a unique equilibrium among an otherwise 
indeterminate set of possible equilibria. 
This raises some obvious questions: as an empirical matter, how does play 
proceed in these games? Is there evidence that players are playing some Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium? Does the belief stationary equilibrium provide an accurate prediction for 
play? Does the sequence of play eventually converge to "complete information play"? 
What empirical regularities or anomalies can be identified? 
We investigate these questions experimentally in the context of a simple 
bargaining game, that we call the holdout game, which is related to a simultaneous­
move version of the bargaining game studied by Chatterjee and Samuelson ( 1987). At 
each point in time, a player may either hold out (H) or give in (G) .  Each player has 
two types . One of the types is a tough player, who has a dominant strategy in the stage 
game of holding out. The other type's best response in the stage game depends on the 
probability that his/her opponent will give in. If that probability is sufficiently high, 
then he/she should give in; if it is suffiCiently ·1ow, he/she should hold out. One can 
think of the game as a simple caricature of a bargaining game, where agreement hinges 
on at least one of the sides making a concession on a particular feature of the contract 
being negotiated. The types then index some combination of the costs to making the 
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concession and the value of the other. terms of. the -contract . Section 2 -solves for a 
symmetric belief-stationary equilibrium of the game. Section 3 describes the 
experimental procedures and the specific parameters of the games that were conducted 
in the laboratory. Section 4 presents the results of the experiment. 
2 THE HOLDOUT GAME 
The holdout game is a two person infinitely repeated game of incomplete' information 
whose stage game is given in the following matrix: 
G H 
G 1 - c1 1 - c2 1 - c1 1
H 1 1 - c2 0 0 
In each round, either player can either give in (G) or hold out (H). If neither player 
gives in, then both players receive a payoff of 0. The basic value of agreement is equal 
to 1 ,  and both players receive this if at least one player gives in. The cost to player i of 
giving in equals ci.
In the analysis that follows, we make the following assumptions. Each player has 
two possible types (values of ci) ,  cL and en. We assume cL < 1 <en . To save on 
notation we write c = cL. Thus in a one-shot game, a en-type (or "high cost" type) has
a dominant strategy of holding out ,  and a c-type (or "low cost" type) does not have a 
dominant strategy. Types are independently drawn with the probability that ci = c
equal to q1 for player 1 and q2 for player 2, which is common knowledge. 
One Shot Bayesian Equilibrium 
Before analyzing the infinitely repeated vers10n of the holdout game, we 
characterize the solution to the one shot game. 
There are three classes of equilibria to the one shot game, depending on the 
relative values of c, and q = (q1, q2). In one kind of equilibrium, one player adopts a
separating strategy (i.e. choose H if ci = en, and G if ci = c )  and the other player
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always holds out, regardless of type. These equilibria-exist-if-�Ji-is sufficiently large for 
at least one of the players. A second kind of equilibrium arises in which both players 
adopt separating strategies. These arise if qi is low for both players. 
The third kind of equilibrium is one in which both players adopt semi-pooling 
strategies (i .e. player i chooses H if ci = c H and choose G with probability Pi > 0 if 
ci = c). Routine calculation shows that the equilibrium Pi depends on qi and c in the
following way: 
p/q) = (1- c)/qi 
In this equilibrium, both players obtain an expected utility of 1 - c. This feature 
of the equilibrium will simplify later calculations. This kind of equilibrium only arises if 
qi> 1 - c for both players . Except for knife edge cases, there are no other kinds of 
equilibrium. 
The Infinitely Repeated Game 
In the infinitely repeated version of the holdout game, we assume both players 
discount future payoffs using the same discount factor, 8, and we solve below for a 
symmetric belief-stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We also conjecture that the 
equilibrium is unique if c + 8 > 1 .
A belief-stationary strategy profile is a collection of four functions, p Hl ( q1, q2), 
P1(q1,q2), PH2(q1,q2) and P2(q1,q2), denoting, for each possible type of each player, the
probability of giving in as a function of the currently held beliefs of both players about 
the type of the other player. Thus, q1 denotes the current belief held by player 2 that
player 1 is a low type, and q2 denotes the current belief held by player 1 that player 2 is
a low type . Symmetry requires that p92(q,q') = PHI(q',q) and p2(q,q') = p1(q',q) for all
(q', q) in the unit square. To reduce notation, we drop the player subscripts, and simply 
look at the strategy of player 1 ,  denoted PH(q1,q2) and p(q1,q2).
Characterization of a symmetric belief stationary equilibrium is done by first 
soh·ing the game at the boundary of the unit square of beliefs (i .  e. , for one sided 
incomplete information, )  which then pins down the equilibrium mixing probabilities for 
interior values of q (i .e . before either player's type has been revealed). This latter task 
is nontrivial, but in our case, i t  is simplified since there is an equilibrium in which high 
cost types always hold out. We conjecture that Pe must identically equal 0 for all 
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beliefs in any belief-stationary equilibrium. The reason is that helief-stationarity rules 
out the kind of history-dependent strategies used in folk-theorem constructions. 
Without such punishment schemes, it would not seem to be possible to provide 
intertemporal threats and incentives to induce high cost types to violate their one-shot 
dominant strategies. While this is not formally proved, we nonetheless restrict 
attention in the remainder of the paper to the equilibrium with pH = 0.
We proceed in two steps. First we show that if beliefs begin on the diagonal 
( q1 =q2), the unique equilibrium path implies to a trajectory of beliefs that remain on
the diagonal until, after some point , they jump to ihe boundary; We-then characterize 
the symmetric belief stationary equilibrium on the diagonal and on the boundary of 
beliefs space. A solution off the diagonal is given in McKelvey and Palfrey (1993). 
For any q = ( q 1, q2) we define V ( q:u) to equal the value to player 1 of the
continuation game under the strategy profile u. We suppress the dependence on u and 
simply write this as V(q). Similarly, we define VG(q) (or VH(q)) to be the value to
player 1 in the continuation game if G (or H, respectively) is chosen in the current 
period. We denote V GG and the future continuation value (starting next period) to
player 1 if both players choose G in the current period; V GH' V GH and V HG are
defined analogously. Finally we assume, throughout :  
ASSUMPTION 1 :  c + 8 > 1 
We first prove that if beliefs are on the diagonal, then in any symmetric belief 
stationary equilibrium, the beliefs in the continuation game of the next period are either 
on the diagonal or on the boundary of the belief space. At the boundary, at least one 
player's type is common knowledge. Therefore, once beliefs reach a boundary, they stay 
on the boundary forever. 
PROPOSITION 1 If q = ( q1, q2) satisfies q1 = q2 = q, then along any symmetric belief­
stationary equilibrium path, the updated beliefs at the beginning of the next 
period, q = (q1,q2), must satisfy either, q1=q2 < q or q1 = 1 or q2=1.
Proof: We first show that q1 = q2 = q implies p(q) > 0. If p(q) = 0, then q = q since
both types hold out . But this implies V( q) = 0, by stationary and symmetry. But 
player 1 can guarantee l _:: 6 > 0 by giving in forever, a contradiction. Since p(q) 2: 0, 
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there are four possible histories: (GG, GH, HG, HH). ..The updated ... beliefs are, 
respectively: 
(1 1) (1 (1- p)q) ((1- p)q 1) ((1- p)q 1- p)q).' ' ' 1 - pq ' 1 - pq ' ' 1 - pq ' 1 - pq 
PROPOSITION 2 If q1 = 1 then V( q) = i = 6· .. 
Proof: If q2 = 1 too, then the unique symmetric belief stationary equilibrium is infinite
repetition of the unique one-shot symmetric Nash equilibrium, where p = 1 - c. This
yields a value of �: 6· The remainder of the proof consists of showing that when q1 = 1
and q2 < 1, the unique equilibrium has p(q) = 1. This implies the result directly. To
prove this, first observe that for low values of q2 (q2 < 1- c) the revealed player (player
1) will always choose G because
vn � q2(1_:6) < i = 6 = va.
(Recall that 1 _: 6 is the highest feasible continuation payoff.) Accordingly, player 2 will
hold out, so (f 2 = q2. 
Next , consider q2 2 1 - c and observe that for the revealed player to have p1<1, 
we must have p2q2 2 1 - c, since the value of continuation to player 1 does not depend
on player 1 's move (by belief stationarity) . This requires p2 2 1 q; c. Therefore, 
following H by player 2, Bayes rule implies: 
q9 + c-1 
q2 < - c 
So, for values of q2 between 1 - c and 1 - c2, this implies q2 < 1 _:_ c. Therefore, the
continuation game following H by player 2 will have player 1 choosing G forever and
player 2 choosing H forever. This gives 
while 
V!j(q) = P1+1�6' 
1/G(q) _ 1 - c 2 -1-6' 
So Vf(q) 21/f"(q) requires c+8 � 1, a contradiction. Therefore, V2(q) = 1_:6 for
ql = l,q2<1-c
2
.
The argument is now completed by induction. Suppose that the equilibrium 
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must always satisfy p1=l,p2=0 for q1 and q2 < l - r:" -:- 1 • Then it.must also.be true
for q2 < 1 - en.
PROPOSITION 3 For all q = (q1,q2), such that q1 > 0, p(q) > 0-+ V(q) = i =8· 
Proof: If p(q) > 0, then VG(q) = V(q). But VG(q) = i = 8 since q1=1 if player 1 chooses
G, and V(l, · ) = i = 8· 
. (l-c)(l-6) ) p PROPOSITION 4 If q = (q1,q2), with q1 = q2 = q > P = 1 _6(l-c), then p(q = q· 
Proof: It is easily verified that p(q) < 1 in the region of q. By proof of proposition 1,
p(q) > 0. Therefore we must have VG(q) = VH(q) = i =8· Thus,
VG( ) _ 1 - c _ VH( ) _ 1 + (1 ) d -c _._ _ P q - 1 - 6 - q - pq 1 -6 - pq u 1 -6 -r p - q·
PROPOSITION 5 If q = (q1, q2), satisfies q1 = q2 = q:::; P, then p(q) = 1.
Proof: From above, there is no mixed strategy equilibrium when p > q. From
Proposition 1, p(q) > 0. Thus, p(q) = 1 is the only possibility. Routine calculations
verify this. 
3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
We conducted 6 laboratory sessions using a total of 80 subjects who were undergraduate
students at California Institute of Technology and Pasadena Community College. The 
sessions were carried out on a system of networked computers at the Caltech Laboratory 
for Experimental Economics and Political Science. Subjects were seated at terminals 
that were separated by partitions . Communication between subjects was prohibited. 
At the beginning of each session, the subjects were randomly divided into equal­
sized sets of red players (the row players) and blue players (the column players) .  
Instructions were read aloud to the subjects and the rules and information structure of 
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the games they were about to play were publicly announced and explained. 
The subjects then played a sequence of between 12  and 15 (depending on how 
long each game lasted) "stochastic horizon" repeated games, called "matches". In each 
match, each red subject was matched with a blue subject, each player was randomly 
assigned a cost-type, and each pair repeatedly played the game until the termination . 
rule was satisfied. A stochastic horizon was induced by using a random stopping rule, 
which was implemented by publicly rolling a 10-sided die after each play of the game. 
The "infinite game" terminated if a 1 was rolled, in order to induce a discount factor of 
8 = .9 . 
After a match, the draw of the opponent 's type was revealed to each player. 
Except after the last match, subjects were then anonymously rematched with a different 
player of the other color, and everyone reassigned a new type. They were never told the 
identity of the players they were matched with, nor were they told the sequence in 
which their opponents were assigned (except that it was "a new opponent" in the next 
match) .  Subjects were informed that their type and the type (and identity) of their 
opponent remained the same in every period of any given match. The complete 
instructions are in Appendix A .  
At  the conclusion of the experiment , subjects were paid in  lottery tickets, 
following a standard procedure for inducing risk neutral preferences over risky 
outcomes. We felt that such a control was important to rule out risk aversion as a 
possible explanation for any deviations from the theoretical predictions that might be 
observed. 
The payoffs used in the experiment consisted of the following four payoff 
matrices. The payoff matrices corresponding to the four possible pairs of cost-types are 
labeled 1-4. At the beginning of each match, one of the four states (matrices) was 
randomly selected. The row player (Red) was told which row the selected matrix was 
in, and the column player was told which column the selected matrix was in. For 
example, if matrix 2 was selected, Red was told it was either 1 or 2 ,  and Blue was told 
it was either 2 or 4. The payoffs were presented arbitrarily, with no reference to "cost­
type" ,  "hold-out" ,  or "give in", etc. Strategies were labeled "A" and "B",  where A 
corresponds to Give In and B corresponds to Hold Out.  
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1 
A B 
A 4,4 4, 6 
B 6,4 2,2 
3 
A B 
A 1,4 1, 6 
B 5,4 4,2 
A 
B 
A 
B 
2 
A B 
4, 1 4,5 
6, 1 2,4 
4 
A B 
1, 1 1, 5 .
5, 1 4,4 
Payoff Tables used in the Experiments 
The payoffs were chosen to produce a game equivalent to the holdout game with 
parameters c = .5 and c H = 4, with the probability of a low cost type equal to . 75 .  The 
top (left) two payoff tables correspond to a low cost type for Red (Blue) , and the 
bottom (right) two matrices correspond to a high cost type for Red (Blue). The payoff 
tables differ cosmetically from the game that is studied in the previous section, but the· 
game is equivalent to the game analyzed in that part of the paper. This is true because 
the utility function of each type is a positive linear transformation2 of the utility for the 
corresponding type in the matrix of Section 2. 
The information structure in all matches except the first four followed exactly 
the information structure described in the theoretical model of section 2.  The first four 
matches were conducted as repeated games of complete information in order for the 
subjects to gain some experience with the screen display and keyboard, the record 
keeping tasks, and the way lottery tickets converted into money. This also afforded 
them an opportunity to become familiar with some of the most basic strategic elements 
of each of the four component games, corresponding to the four possible type profiles, 
(c , c), (c , c9) , (c9, c ), and (c9, cJi): "These four matches were conducted in that exact 
sequence. A discount factor of 8 = . 75  was induced in these complete information 
2To obtain the payoff function of Section 2, subtract 2 units from the payoffs of the low types
and then divide by four, and subtract 4 units from the payoffs of the high types. 
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games to reduce the amount of time they took. In-these.matches, each subject was told 
the opponent 's type before the first period of the match by telling them exactly which 
one of the four payoff matrices was being used, and this was made common knowledge. 
After approximately two hours, the experimental session was ended following the 
termination of a match. Subjects were then paid their earnings privately in cash, one at 
a time, in an adjoining room. 
4 DATA ANALYSIS 
The data analysis addresses three questions. First, how well does the symmetric belief 
stationary equilibrium account for the data in our experiment? Second, is there 
evidence that subjects eventually play an equilibrium strategy for the true state? 
Third, does behavior change across matches, as subjects become more experienced? 
Our data consisted of a total of 239 matches of varying length, which yielded a 
total of 370 Low type subjects and 108 High type subjects. The matches were 
distributed among the four information states as in Table 1 .  The actual and expected 
distribution of match lengths are given in Figure 1 and Table 2. 
Player 2 
Low High 
Player 1 Low 141 48 189 
High 40 10 50 
18 1 58 239 
Table 1 
Frequency of information states in experimental matches 
10 
T f(T)
1 28 
2 10 
3 20 
4 12 
6 1 1  
7 14 
8 24 
9 34 
10 5 
1 1  19 
12  6 
13  14  
15 12 
22 1 1  
28 8 
30 5 
35 6 
Total 239 
Table 2 
Frequency Distribution of Match Lengths 
1 1  
Belief stationarity 
The first question is addressed by comparing the data to the predictions of 
propositions 1-4 in Section 2 of the paper. We separate out the predictions for the high 
and low types. 
The prediction for the high types is that they should never give in. Table 3 
displays the data relevant to this hypothesis. (See also Figure 2.) On the first move 9% 
(n = 108 ) of the high types choose to give in. This drops to an average of about 2-3% 
after the first round. The average probability of giving in, across all rounds, is about 
3% (n = 1 165) .  The data in Table 1 are aggregated across all incomplete information 
matches . 
Round % n 
1 0 .0926 108 
2-5 0.0242 330 
6-10 0 .0277 325 
1 1-20 0.0251 239 
21-30 0.0362 1 38 
31-36 0 .0000 25 
Total 0 .0326 1 165 
Table 3 
Proportion of High types giving in 
by round 
The prediction for the low types is more complicated. On the first move, the 
low types should give in with probability .121 . The actual frequency that the low types 
give in on the first move is 44% (n=370 ). 
On the subsequent moves, the prediction for the low types depends on the 
history . As long as neither subject has given in, the low types should update their 
beliefs to a continually lower estimate that the oppon_ent is a low �ype, and the 
probability that they give in should gradually increase, from . 121 in the first move to 
about .15 in move 5 .  The predicted and actual proportion of low types that give in 
when neither subject has yet given in is given in Table 4. (See also Figure 3.) It is 
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evident that the proportion that actually give jn -is . significantly higher than the 
predicted proportion. 
Round p* p n 
1 . 121 .441 370 
2 . 125 .454 1 19 
3 . 130 .435 46 
4 . 136 .353 1 7  
5 . 143 . 182  1 1  
6 . 152 .444 9 
7 . 163 .667 3 
8 . 177  .000 1 
Total . 124 .436 576 
Table 4 
Predicted (p*) and actual (p) proportion of Low types giving in
when neither subject has revealed 
Given that one or both players have revealed themselves to be a low type (by 
choosing to give in) the equilibrium strategy for the low type is as follows: If both 
subjects simultaneously revealed themselves to be low, then both players should 
subsequently choose to give in with probability .5 in each round. If only the opponent 
has given in, then the player should give in with probability 0 .  If the player in question 
has given in, but the opponent has not, then the player should give in with probability 
1. Table 5 shows the data for the Low types in the case when at least one subject has
revealed . (See also Figure 3 . )  In the early rounds, there are occasional attempts by the 
subject who has revealed to refrain from continuing to give in. Also, about ten percent 
of the time, the subject who has not revealed will reveal even after the other subject has 
already revealed. After about the fifth round, the figure shows that at least at a highly 
aggregated level, the behavior is fairly consistent with the equilibrium predictions. 
In addition to giving round by round data, Table 4 also gives the frequency of 
giving in on the first move after at least one subject has revealed. This is in the row 
labeled "First Revelation." Here also, ten percent of the time, the s.ubje�t who has not
yet revealed reveals after the opponent has revealed. 
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Player that has revealed 
Both n Self n Other 
Predicted .500 1.00 0.00 
2 � 327 55 .789 90 . 103  
R 3 .605 8 1  .87 7  1 14 . 132 
0 4 .465 99 .848 105 .095 
u 5 .533 105 .9 17  96  . 122 
N 6-10 .561 472 .9 13  38 1 .012 D 1 1-20 .541 290 .955 242 .000 
21-35 .462 121 .955 134 .029 
Total .529 1223 .908 1 162 .058 
First Revelation .500 80 .826 149 .100 
Table 5 
Proportion of Low Types Giving in by whether subject and 
Opponent have Revealed (R) or Not (N) 
n 
68 
7 6  
63 
49 
1 63 
95 
34 
548 
90 
Although Table 5 shows that in the case where both subjects have revealed their 
type, that the subjects give in approximately 50% of the time (as predicted) , this masks 
what is really going on in the data. If we look at individual level data, we find that in 
most of these cases, one of the subjects is giving in every round, while the opponent is 
holding out every round. Thus, at the aggregate level, 50% of the subjects in this 
category are giving in, but in fact all pairs are playing a pure strategy equilibrium. 
Table 6 illustrates this phenomenon. (See also Figure 4 . )  This table displays the 
probability of giving in as a function of the previous period move. We see that if both 
subjects have given in, or both subjects have held out , then there is about a 50% chance 
of giving , or holding out on the next move. Thus these two categories tend to empty 
out , and get smaller over time. On the other hand, once one subject gives in, and the 
other holds out , that pattern persists with a probability of at least .9 (by move 5 )  into 
the next move. Thus eventually, each pair settles into a pure strategy equilibrium 
where one player holds._011t, . .a.nd_the...ath.er.nllxes . .. �W��� mi*4.-ng.-0r�·alternation 
schemes. This pure strategy equilibrium occurs even when both subjects have revealed 
their type . 
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Round GG n GH n HG n HH n 
2 .327 55 . 789 90 . 103 68 .454 1 19 
3 . 7 10 38 .887 106 . 129 70 .476 103 
4 .546 44 .838 117  . 103 78 .378 45 
5 .478 23 .893 112  . 119 67 .559 59 
6- 10 .566 122 .913  496 . 100 279 .538 132 
1 1-20 .539 26 .962 366 .033 210 .600 25 
21-35 .333 3 .945 182 .000 82  .545 22 
Total .527 31 1  .912 1469 .079 854 .497 505 
Table 6 
Probability of Low type giving in 
as a function of move of subject and opponent in previous round 
Our second question concerns whether there is any evidence for the theorems of Kalai 
and Lehrer and Jordan (KL-J) . Do subjects eventually play an equilibrium for the
correct state? We should emphasize that there is no way that we could present 
evidence that would refute this assertion. First, the theorems say nothing about how 
long it should take for convergence. Second, once we drop the assumption of belief 
stationarity, folk theorems may apply, and we must consider the possibility that nearly 
any pattern of play that we see in the first K periods might be part of an equilibrium to 
the infinitely repeated game that could be enforced by sufficiently severe punishments 
off the equilibrium path. Thus, the most we could hope to do is present any obvious 
evidence supporting the KL-J hypothesis, if such evidence exists. 
A first question relevant to the KL-J hypothesis is whether subjects were able to 
figure out the correct state. In our experiments, after each match was over, we asked 
subjects to guess the true state before it was revealed to them. We did not pay subjects 
anything to reveal this information to us, since we did not want to contaminate their 
incentives for choosing optimal strategies. Nevertheless, they had no obvious reason to 
intentionally misreport this information. We summarize it in Table 7 .  Table 7 shows 
that subjects were only able to,.guess .the.state.carr.eci1.¥..a.baut.£8%--0f .t.he..time .. Players
who were high types did better than low types, and all subjects did somewhat better 
when their opponent was a low type than when their opponent was a high type. This is 
what one would expect at the predicted equilibrium. There does not seem to be any 
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increase in the success rate as the length of the. match jncreases. Jn fact, if .anything, 
the accuracy of the prediction goes down as the length of the match increases, 
indicating that the early periods reveal most, if not all of the information that is 
revealed. 
Player Type 
High Low 
Opponent · Opponent
H L H L Total 
T>O . 7 37 ( 19) .786 (84) .560 (84) .685 (257 ) .682  (444) 
T> 5 . 7 14  (14) .8 14 (59) .576 (59) .664 ( 176 )  .679 (308) 
T > 10 .600 (10 )  . 769 (26) .539 (26) .667 (84) .657 (146) 
Table 7 
Percent correct guess of state 
by player type, opponent type, and length (T) of match
Of course , the KL-J hypothesis does not require that subjects learn the correct 
state, only that they play an equilibrium of the correct state. To address this question, 
we will select some salient equilibria for each state, and find out how frequently in our 
experiments, the subjects eventually select one of the equilibria of the correct state. 
Once we drop the condition of belief stationarity, a strategy is a function which 
determines for each possible history, h, a probability p(h) = (p1(h), p2(h)) that each
player will give in. Consider the following equilibria for each state 
Both High p(h) = (0 ,0 )  =PHH for all h
One High, two Low p(h) = (0 , 1 )  = PHL for all h
One Low, two High p(h) = ( 1 ,0 )  = PLH for all h
Both Low p(h) = ( 1 ,0 )  = PLLl for all h, or
p(h) = (0 , 1 ) = PLL2 for all h 
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We cannot, of course observe behavior for histories that do not occur in the data. 
Instead, we simply check whether the data in our experiments converges to the 
equilibrium play that is predicted by the above strategies. For each match, and each 
round t, and each player, i; we compute the cumulative average Pi(t) up to time t that
player i has given in. Write p(t) = (p1(t),p2(t)). Convergence to equilibrium entails
that for each true state s, limt p(t) _. p;, where P! is one of the selected equilibria for
the true state. Figures 1-4 show the results of these calculations, with one figure for 
each true state. These figures show the time path of the difference p 2( t) - p 1 ( t) for
each match. Thus, each match corresponds to a line on the figure. A small random 
error has been added to each line to help indicate the number of matches at each point . 
The end of a match is indicated by a square. For state 1, convergence is equivalent to 
the difference going to + 1 or - 1 .  For states 2 and 3, convergence is equivalent to the 
difference going to + 1 and - 1 respectively. For state 4, convergence implies that the 
difference goes to 0 .  The figures are roughly consistent with convergence. 
Experience 
The analysis above is at a highly aggregated level. In this section we break down the 
analysis according to how much experience a subject has had. Recall that in each 
session, subjects play up to 14 matches, each one of which is an "infinitely" repeated 
game. Because of the combined presence of asymmetric information and dynamics, one 
might expect systematic changes in the behavior of subjects across matches, as they 
become more experienced in the task and become more familiar with the strategic 
subtleties of the environment . That subjects adjust their behavior in predictable ways 
has been well-documented in most experimental environments. 
Vve first examine behavior by high-cost types. We find that there is no significant 
change in behavior for these types (see Table 2) between the first five matches and the 
remaining matches. While there is 50% more giving-in by inexperienced low types, 
this is based on very small numbers (a total of 10 observations of giving-in out of 108 
chances) . 
In contrast, the behavior of low-cost types changes a lot with experience. Figure 9 
displays the give-in frequencies in the first , second and third moves as a function of 
experience, conditional on both players in the match having held out in previous moves. 
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Here we use a finer breakdown of the experience _v..ariable. . -Fnr .the .. first .move data,
there is sufficient data so that we are able to break it down by the match number. 
That is, data from "match number 1" pools the data of all low-cost type moves from 
the first match that has been played during the session.3 In the data from move 2, 
there was insufficient data to do this, since cases are excluded if either player gave in on 
move 1 .  Therefore, we report 3-match moving averages for the move 2 data. That is, 
the data reported as match number 2 data in the figure is averaged 
over matches 1, 2, and 3 .  In general, the data reported as match number t is  averaged 
over matches t-1, t and t+l. The same is true for the move 3 data. 
The results are striking. Experience leads low-cost players to hold out more . 
frequently in the early stages of a match, when neither player has given in yet. This 
leads to giving-in frequencies more in line with the theoretical predictions. Recall 
(Table 3) that the prediction is for give-in frequencies below 20% in the early rounds of 
a match ,  and that there should be virtually no difference in the give-in probabilities 
between moves 1 ,  2 ,  and 3. Inexperienced subjects systematically violate both of these 
predictions: For example, in match 2, subjects give in 40% of the time in the first 
move, 55% of the time on the second (conditional) move, and 100% of the time on 
the third (conditional) move. While the order is consistent with the theory (give-in 
frequencies should be increasing in the move), both the magnitudes of the give-in 
frequencies and the magnitude of the cross-move differences in the give-in probabilities 
are much too large. By the end of a session (match 10), give in probabilities have 
dropped to around 20% in all three moves, with no significant cross-move differences. 
Finally, we examine the effect of experience on the ex post guessing accuracy of the 
players . Here the theoretical predictions differ depending on the state, and depending 
on whether the guess is made by a high-cost type or a low-cost type. We break down 
the data by match number, taking 3-match moving averages as above for states 2 and 3, 
due to small sample sizes. State 4 (High,High) occurred only ten times, so this was 
excluded entirely. The results are displayed in Figure 9 .  In all cases, experience leads 
to more accurate guessing. Recall that this is different from the result we obtained for 
"within match" experience. That is, subjects did not guess better in longer matches 
than they did in shorter matches (Table 7) . Thus we conclude that it is experience 
across matches ·-that matters. "The improvement in guessing accuracy is particularly 
strong for low types in states 2 and 3, where accuracy improves from 42% to 80%. 
3More precisely, it is the first incomplete information match. Recall that there were four 
complete information matches that preceded the incomplete information matches. 
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Pooling across all states and types, overall accuracy begins under 60%-and .ends up just 
over 75%. Since the probability of playing a low opponent is 75%,  this is almost exactly 
the accuracy that would occur by making the best guess at the beginning of the game, 
conditioning only on one's own assigned type (i.e. guess the other player is a low-type) . 
One surprising feature of the experience data is that there is very little difference 
in the guessing accuracy of experienced high-types and low-types in games 2 and 3. 
Theoretically there should be a difference, with high-type accuracies near 1 and low­
type accuracies between .5 and . 75 .  
Summary
In summary, we see significant deviations from the symmetric belief stationary 
equilibrium. Most significantly, we find 
• The probability of giving in before either subject has revealed is
consistently too high, ( .45 vs . 12) but converges toward the equilibrium
with experience.
• The Low types will occasionally (about 10% of the time) give m and
reveal themselves to be Low even after their opponent has done so.
• There is no evidence of a mixed equilibrium once both subjects have
revealed. Rather, one subject gets stuck giving in for ever.
• The High types, especially on their first move, do not always adopt their
dominant strategy of always holding out ( 10% error rate on the first
move.)
• Experience leads to more accurate inferences by subjects about the type of
opponents they are facing.
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The theoretical model based on the Bayesian equilibrium of an infinitely 
repeated game generates predictions that are not well-supported in data from 
inexperienced subjects ,  but are much better supported in data from experienced 
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subjects. The give-in probabilities of low-cost types are significantly .higher than theory 
would predict, but steadily,_decline and approach the theoretical predictions as subjects 
gain experience. The ability of subjects of make accurate inferences about which game 
they are engaged in (i.e. ability to identify the opponent's type from observed histories) 
also shows a steady improvement with experience. The two qualitative predictions that 
seem to hold up regardless of experience are: 1) high types rarely give in (rare violation 
of dominated strategies); and 2) if a low-type player gives in before its opponent gives 
in , that player gives in in almost all subsequent moves of the match. The only 
qualitative prediction that completely fails , with experienced subjects as well as 
inexperienced subjects, is that we do not observe mixing behavior by low types in 
matches where both players gave in for the first time on the same move. Rather, 
following such histories, one of the two players eventually ends up contributing in 
(almost) all later moves, while the other player (almost) exclusively holds out .  
W e  believe the last observation is  due to the fact that in the game of complete 
information played by two low-cost types (which is simply a version of the game 
Chicken) , the mixed strategy equilibrium is unstable, under many definitions of 
stability of a Nash equilibrium (e.g. Cournot stability, fictitious play, replicator 
dynamic, etc .) . The only stable equilibria of that game are the two asymmetric pure 
strategy equilibria in which one player gives in and the other holds out. We conjecture 
that there is an alternative model, related to stability, that is well-suited to the 
incomplete information environment in our experiments and that can also explain the 
fact that the play of these games always eventually comes down to exactly one of the 
low-types giving in. The model is based on "imperfect play" of the sort studied in 
McKelvey and Palfrey ( 1992) ,  El-Gamal and Palfrey ( 1993), El-Gamal, McKelvey and 
Palfrey ( 1993 ), and Schmidt ( 1992). These models are similar in spirit to ideas 
developed by Harsanyi ( 1973) and Selten ( 1975) ,  both of which introduce the possibility 
of "noisy play" in a rigorous (but different) way. Suppose that players cannot perfectly 
implement a behavioral strategy, but may instead accidentally choose some other 
(nonequilibrium) beha,·ioral strategy with some probability, and further suppose that 
these trembling probabilities are commonly known by all the players. This produces a 
more complicated game of incomplete information in which the inferences by players 
about their opponent's i:ype can never rule out eitber type .... That .. is , if a p1ayer observes
an opponent give in. there is some probability that the opponent is a high-cost type who 
erred. This means, for example, that even when both players are low types and they 
both give in first at the same move, the continuation stage game is not the complete 
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information game of chicken, but simply a. game of incomplete information in which 
both players are more likely to be low-cost types than in the previous move. More 
importantly, if in the continuation game one of the players happens to give in before the 
other, that player then becomes the more likely one to be a low-cost type. We 
conjecture that the equilibrium to this error version of the game will have the property 
that, as the probability of errors becomes smap, later moves of a match (with at least 
one low-cost type) will necessarily see one player giving in with probability close to one 
and the other player holding out with. probability close to one. Moreover, in the 
equilibrium of this perturbed game, there would always be some . .smalL probability 
(increasing with the probability of error) that two low-cost players will at some point 
appear to "reverse roles", with the player who had been holding out giving in and the 
player who had been giving in holding out. 
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APPENDIX A 
Instructions for the Experiments 
This is an experiment in group decision making, and you will be paid for your 
participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.  Different subjects may earn 
different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the 
decisions of others, and partly on chance. 
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all 
interaction between you will take place through the computers. It is important that 
you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other . subjects during the 
experiments. If you disobey the rules, we will have to ask •you to -leave the experiment. 
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you · 
will be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the 
computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand 
and your question will be answered so everyone can hear. 
The subjects will be divided into two groups, containing equal number of 
subjects. The groups will be labeled the RED group and the BLUE group. To 
determine which color you are, will you each please select an envelope as the 
experimenter passes by you. 
[EXPERIMENTER PASS OUT ENVELOPES] 
If you chose BLUE, you will be BLUE for the entire experiment. If you chose 
RED, you will be RED for the entire experiment. Please remember your color, because 
the instructions are slightly different for the BLUE and the RED subjects. 
[DISPLAY PAYOFF TABLES USING AN OVERHEAD] 
1 2 
A B A B 
A 4,4 4,6 A 4,1  4,5 
B 6,4 2,2 B 6 ,1  2 ,4 
3 4 
A B A B 
A 1 ,4 1 ,6 A 1 , 1  1 ,5 
B 5,4 4,2 B 5,1 4,4 
[Note: The row payoffs were written in Red, and the column payoffs were written in 
Blue. This was also done on the subjects' computer screens.] 
The four tables in this figure represent the four possible payoff tables that will be 
used in this experiment. They are indicated as table 1 ,  table 2 ,  table 3, and table 4. 
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The experiment will consist of a number of matches. __ Jn _each -match, you-will first be 
matched with another subject of the opposite color. The experimenter will then select 
one of the four payoff matrices. Whichever one is selected will be the one that you use 
for the entire match. Each match will consist of a number of rounds. In each round, 
you and the subject you are matched with will simultaneously choose actions (RED 
chooses U or D, BLUE chooses L or R) . The payoff matrix that is selected gives the 
payoff, in points, to you and the subject that you are matched with for a single round of 
the match. You will repeat this for each round. 
In each match, after each round, we will roll a four sided die. If it comes up 
with a 1 ,  then the match will end. Otherwise, we continue with another round. Thus, 
in each match, we will continue to run · additional rounds until the. first time the die 
lands with a 1 .  For example, if the first time the die comes up with a one is on the 
third round, then this means that the match will ·consist of three rnunds. 
To compute your payoff for a match, we will first compute the match value. 
This is the value per round times the number of rounds. Each round is worth a value of 
. 1 5 . Thus, the match is worth . 1 5  times the number of rounds in the match. In each 
match, you will either earn the match value or 0 .  To determine whether you earn the 
match value or 0 ,  we compute the number of points you earned in the match and divide 
it by the maximum possible number of points you could have made. This value is 
multiplied by 1000 to determine your score for the match. (In this case, the maximum 
possible number of points is 6 times the number of rounds. )  Your score represents the 
number of lottery tickets you own out of a total of 1000 . Thus, if your score is 437, you 
own all the numbers from 0 up to, but not including, 437. To determine your payoff, 
we will draw a lottery ticket for you between 0 and 999. If the ticket is one of the 
tickets you own, you win the value of the match . Otherwise, you get nothing for the 
match. 
The experiment consists of several matches. In each match, you are matched 
with a different player of the opposite color from yours. Thus, if you are a BLUE 
player, in each game, you will be matched with a RED player. If you are a RED 
player, in each game you are matched with a BLUE player. 
[BEGIN COMPUTER INSTRUCTION] 
We will now begin the computer instruction session. During the instruction 
session, we will teach you how to use the computer by going through a few practice 
games. During the instruction session, do not hit any keys until you are told to do so, 
and 'vhen you are told to enter information, type exactly what you. are told to type. You 
are not paid for these practice games. 
Please turn on your computer now by pushing the button labeled "MASTER" on 
the right hand side of the panel underneath the screen. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO TURN ON COMPUTERS] 
When the computer prompts you for your name, type your full name. Then hit 
the ENTER key. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS �'.ID...filiTER.. NA.MES] .
When you are asked to enter your color, type R if your color is RED, and B if 
your color is BLUE. Then hit ENTER. · 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO ENTER COLORS] 
You now see the experiment screen. Throughout the experiment, the bottom of 
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the screen will tell you what is currently happening., and -the-.top will -show you the 
payoff table. 
The top line of the upper part of the screen tells you your subject number and 
your color. Please record your color and subject number on the top left hand corner of 
your record sheet . 
Each of the four possible payoff tables is shown on the upper screen. In this 
match, the first table has been selected. ·This is indicated by the fact that the first 
payoff table is highlighted in gray. This means table one will be used for the entire first 
match. 
The bottom part of the screen prompts you for your input and records the moves 
that have been made by you and the other subject. The subject that you are matched 
with is indicated on the second row of the bottom screen . .  , ·  It :is ·important, to note that 
you will be matched with a new subject for each match. 
· We will now start the first practice game. Remember, do not hit any keys until
you are told to do so. If you are a RED subject, you are prompted to enter a choice of 
the row (U or D ) . If you are a BLUE subject, you are prompted to enter a choice of a 
column (L or R) . Will all the RED subject please choose U and all the BLUE subjects 
please choose L on your terminals now. After you enter your choice, you must confirm 
it by pressing Y. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE] 
Since RED chose U and BLUE chose L, this means that the outcome is in the 
upper left hand cell of the highlighted table, so that the BLUE subject gets a payoff of 
XXX, and the RED subject gets a payoff of XXX. The move that was chosen by each 
subject , as well as your payoff is recorded on the bottom of the screen. 
In the actual experiment, at this point, we would throw a four sided die to 
determine whether to stop the match or continue with another round. For the practice 
session, we will not actually throw the die, but we will show you what your payoff 
would be if we threw the first one on the fourth round. 
The match now proceeds to the second round. The second round is just like the 
first . This time, will the RED subject please choose U, and the BLUE subject choose 
R, and then confirm your choice. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE] 
Since RED chose U and BLUE chose R, this means that- the outcome is in the 
upper right hand cell , so that the RED subject gets a payoff of XXX, and the BLUE 
subject gets a payoff of XXX. The move that was chosen by each subject, as well as 
your payoff is again recorded on the bottom of the screen. The match now proceeds to 
the third round. 
[HA VE SUBJECTS DO 2 MORE ROUNDS (DL and DR)] 
In the practice match, we are assuming that the match ends after the fourth 
round. This means that you will be paid for 4 rounds in this match. Enter this number 
in column ( 1 )  of your recrn::d ..sheet •• .Each....raund..is .'\11£GC.th .. �.J...5.. ... So�tJie...toW-va.lue of this 
match is V = $ .60 .  Enter this in column (2) .  The total number of points you could 
have earned is 4 times 6 ,  or 24. Enter this in column (3) . Now, add up your own 
payoffs for the first 3 rounds, and enter this in column (4) . Divide this number by 24, 
and multiply by 1 000 to get your score. Enter this number in column (5). Your score 
is the number of lottery tickets you have earned. You have all of the lottery tickets 
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numbered from 0 up to (but not including) s. To _determine._your lottery -number, we 
will throw three ten sided dice to determine a number between 0 and ·999, You will
then add 100 times your player number to this number to determine your lottery ticket. 
If your lottery ticket is a number below s, then you earn V. If it is above or equal to s,
you earn $0.00 for this match. 
[THROW DICE to get L) 
We have thrown a number L. Enter this number in column (6) .  If L is below s 
(your entry in column 6 ), then enter V into the final column (column 7) . If L is above 
or equal to s, then enter $0.00 into the final column. You are not being paid for the 
practice session, but if this were the real experiment ,  then the payoff you have recorded 
in the column P would be money you have earned from the first match, and you would 
be paid this amount for that game at the end of the experiment. The total you earn 
over all of the matches is what you will be paid for your participation in the 
experiment. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD PAYOFFS) 
I 
This concludes the practice session. In the actual experiment there will be 
several matches, and, of course, it will be up to you to make your own decisions. After 
the last match, the experiment ends and we will pay each of you privately, in cash, the 
TOTAL amount you have accumulated during all ten games, plus your guaranteed five 
dollar participation fee. No other person will be told how much cash you earned in the 
experiment . You need not tell any other participants how much you earned. 
Are there any questions before we begin? 
[ANSWER QUESTIONS) 
We will now begin with the actual experiment .  If there are any problems from 
this point on, raise your hand and an experimenter will come and assist you. 
[START EXPERIMENT) 
[SECOND PART OF EXPERIMENT] 
At this point, we are going to change the rules. You will now be using the same 
payoff tables as before, and will be paid in exactly the same manner. The only 
difference will be the information that you have. As before, prior to a match, we will 
draw one of the four payoff tables to be the one that you will use. However, this time, 
you will not be told which payoff table is being used. If you are a Red player, you will 
only be told whether the payoff table is one of the top two or one of the bottom two. If 
you are the Blue player you will only be told that it is one of the two on the left or one 
of the two on the right . The information will be indicated on your screen by 
highlighting one of the possible payoff matrices. You will only know that the correct 
payoff matrix is one of the highlighted ones. [Note: In the original script , "Blue" and 
"Red" were reversed in the above paragraph. However, we believe there was no 
confusion because the information conditions were illustrated using color-coded 
overhead, where the experimenter explicitly showed which payoff tables would be 
highlighted for each color of player and the computer screens were color-coded. 
We will determine which payoff table to use by rolling two four sided dice. We 
will roll the first four sided die. If it comes up with a one, we will choose one of the 
bottom two tables, otherwise we choose one of the top two. We then roll a second four 
sided die. If it comes up with a one, we choose the right hand table. Otherwise, we 
choose the left hand table . .  
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APPENDIX B 
Data, Tables and Figures 
The data is in the following format: 
Experiment #:  1-4 
Match number: 1-oo (Match 1 was a practice match, matches 2-5 were full information) 
Subject color: l=Redi 2=Blue (only Red data included-Blue can be inferred from Red) 
Red subject #: 1-10 
Blue subject #:  1-10 (subject number of opponent) 
State: 1-4 ( l=LL, 2=LH, 3=HL, 4=HH) 
Guess: 1-4 
Subject Type: O=Low, l=High 
Number of rounds: 1-oo 
The remainin� data for each record consists of pairs (rt, bt), where rt is Red's move inround t, and b is Blue's move in Round t. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 3 3 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 4 4 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 5 5 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 2 1 2 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 2 1 3 4 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 2 1 4 5  1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 2 1 5 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 3 1 1 3 2 0 0  1 0 1 
1 3 1 2 4 2 0 0  1 0 1 
1 3 1 3 5 2 0 0 1 0 0 
1 3 1 4 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 
1 3 1 5 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 
1 4 1 1  4 3 0 1 1 1 0 
1 4 1 2 5 3 0 1 1 1 0 
1 4 1 3 1 3 0 1 1 1 0 
1 4 1 4 2 3 0 1 1 1 0 
1 4 1 5 3 3 0 1 1 1 0 
1 5 1 1 5 4 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 5 1 2 1 4 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 5 1 3 2 4 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 5 1 4 3 4 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 5 1 5 4 4 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 6 1 1 1 2 2 0 9 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 6 1 2 2 4 4 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 6 1 3 3 2 2 0 9_ . LLO .l O .. LO .. LO J. .0_.1_ . .tl.LO J.JLl
1 6 1 4 4 1 1 0 9 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
1 6 1 5 5 3 3 1 9 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 7 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 
1 7 1 2 3 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 
1 7 1 3 4 3 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 
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1 7 1 4 5 3 3 1  2 1 0 1  0 
1 7 1 5 1  3 3 1  2 1 1 1 0 
1 8 1 1 3  1 1 0 1 1  0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 8 1 2 4 2 2 0  1 1  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 l ·O 1 0 1
1 8 1 3 5 2 2 0  1 1  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 8 1 4 1 1 1 0  1 1  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 8 1 5 2 1 2 0 1 1  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 9 1 1 4  2 2 0  10 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 9 1 2 5 1 2 0 10  0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 9 1 3 1  2 2 0  10 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 9 1 4 2  1 2 0 10  0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 9 1 5 3  1 2 0  10  1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 10 1 1 5 1 1 0 22 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 . 1 0 1 0 .1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 10  1 2 1 3 3 1 22 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 10  1 3 2 1 1 0 22 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 4 3  1 2 0 22 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 0  1 5 4 1 1 0 22 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1  3 3 1 30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 1 1  1 2 2 4 4 1  30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 0 30 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1  1 4 4 2 2 0  30 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 5 5  1 1 0 30 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 12  1 1 2 1 1 0 9 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 12 1 2 3 2 2 0 9 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 12  1 3 4 2 2 0  9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 12  1 4 5 2 2 0 9 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 12 1 5 1 1 1 0 9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 13 1 1 3 2 2 0 2 1 1 0 1 
1 13  1 2 4 3 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 13  1 3 5 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 
1 13 1 4 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 0 1 
1 13  1 5 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 
1 14 1 1 4 1 1 0 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 14 1 2 5 1 1 0 8 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 14 1 3 1 2 2 0  8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 14 1 4 2 1 2 0 8 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
1 14 1 5 3 1 1 0 8 .. O . .l-1 .L.Ll .l .l .D..1 . .D ..l.1lJ.JJ 1
1 15 1 1 5 1 2 0 6 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 15 1 2 1 3 4 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 15 1 3 2 1 1 0 6 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 15 1 4 3 2 2 0 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 15 1 5 4 1 2 0 6 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
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1 16 1 1 1 3 4 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 16 1 2 2  2 2 0  8 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 16 1 3 3 1 2 0 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 16 1 4 4 3 3 1 8 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 16 1 5 5 2 2 0 8 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
2 1 1 2 2  1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
2 1 1 3 3  1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1  
2 1 1 4 4 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
2 1 1 5 5  1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
2 1 1 6 6 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 ·1 1 0 1. 1 
2 2 1 1 2  2 0 0  2 0 1 1 1 
2 2 1 2 3 2 0 0  2 0 1 0 1 
2 2 1 3 4 2 0 0  2 0 1 0 1 
2 2 1 4 5  2 0 0  2 0 1 0 1  
2 2 1 5 6  2 0 0  2 0 0 1 1 
2 2 1 6 1  2 0 0  2 0 1 0 1 
2 3 1 1 3 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 
2 3 1 2 4 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0  
2 3 1 3 5 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 
2 3 1 4 6  1 0 0  2 0 1 1 1 
2 3 1 5 1  1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
2 3 1 6 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0  
2 4 1 1 4  3 0 1  1 0 0 
2 4 1 2 5 3 0 1  1 1 0 
2 4 1 3 6 3 0 1  1 1 0 
2 4 1 4 1  3 0 1  1 1 1 
2 4 1 5 2 3 0 1  1 1 0 
2 4 1 6 3 3 0 1  1 1 0 
2 5 1 1 5 4 0 1  3 1 1 0 1 1 1 
2 5 1 2 6 4 0 1  3 1 0 1 1 1 1 
2 5 1 3 1  4 0 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 5 1 4 2 4 0 1  3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 5 1 5 3 4 0 1  3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 5 1 6 4 4 0 1  3 1 1 0 1 1 1 
2 6 1 1 6 2 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
2 6 1 2 1 3 0 1 22 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 6 1 3 2 1 0 0 22 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 G 1 4 3 1 0 0 22 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
') G 1 5 4 1 1 0 22 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
2 G 1 6 5 3 0 1 22 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 [) .1 0  
2 i 1 1 1 1 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
2 i 1 2 2 1 0 0 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
') i 1 3 3 1 2 0 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 ... 
2 i 1 4 4 1 2 0 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 i 1 5 5 1 1 0 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
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2 7 1 6 6  1 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0  
2 8 1 1 2  1 1 0  9 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
2 8 1 2 3 1 1 0  9 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
2 8 1 3 4  1 2 0 9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -0 1 0 1
2 8 1 4 5  2 1 0  9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
2 8 1 5 6 2 1 0  9 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
2 8 1 6 1 1 1 0  9 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
2 9 1 1 3  1 1 0 1 0 1
2 9 1 2 4 3 2 1  1 1 1
2 9 1 3 5 2 1 0  1 0 1
2 9 1 4 6 1 1 0 1 0 1
2 9 1 5 1  2 2 0  1 1 1
2 9 1 6 2 1 2 0  1 0 1
2 10  1 1 4 4 4 1 13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 r 1 
2 10  1 2 5 1 3 0 13 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 10  1 3 6 3 3 1 13 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 1 0  1 4 1 1 2 0 13 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2 1 0  1 5 2 3 3 1 13 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 1 0  1 6 3 1 1 0 13  0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 1
2 1 1 1 2 6 2 1 0  3 0 1 0 1 0 1
2 1 1 1 3 1  2 2 0  3 0 1 0 1 0 1
2 1 1  1 4 2 1 2 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 1 1 5 3 1 2 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 1
2 1 1 1 6 4 1 2 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 1
2 12  1 1 6 1 2 0 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
2 1 2  1 2 1 1 1 0 9 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
2 1 2  1 3 2 1 2 0 9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 2  1 4 3 4 4 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
. 2 1 2  1 5 4 3 3 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
2 1 2  1 6 5 2 2 0 9 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 13  1 1 1 1 1 0 8 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2 1 3  1 2 2 1 1 0 8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 3  1 3 3 3 3 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
2 1 3  1 4 4 3 3 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 1 3  1 5 5 1 2 0 8 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 3  1 6 6 3 3 1 8 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 14  1 1 2 1 1 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 4  1 2 3 1 1 0 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 
2 14 1 3 4 1 2 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 14  1 4 5 3 4 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 14  1 5 6 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 
2 1 4  1 6 1 1 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 5  1 1 3 1 1 0 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 5  1 2 4 1 1 0 4 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
2 1 5  1 3 5 2 2 0 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 5 1 4 6 1 3 0  4 . 0 .1 D_ l 0 1  .. 0 1
2 1 5  1 5 1 1 1 0 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 1 5  1 6 2 1 1 0 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
2 1 6  1 1 4 3 0 1 35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
40 
2 16 1 2 5 1 1 0 35 0 1 0 J. 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 :1--0 l 0 1 .0 1 -0 1 0 -l 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0  
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
2 16 1 3 6 2 2 0  35 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 16 1 4 1 3 3 1 35 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 16 1 5 2 2 2 0 35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 i 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
2 16 1 6 3 3 3 1 35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 . 1 0 1  0 . 1  0 1 0.1 0 1 D 1 0 1 0 1  0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
3 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
3 1 1 3 3 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1  
3 1 1  4 4 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
3 1 1 5 5 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1  
3 1 1 6 6 1 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
3 1 1 7 7 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1  
3 1 1 8 8  1 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
3 2 1 1 2  4 0 1  1 1 1 
3 2 1 2 3 4 0 1  1 1 1 
3 2 1 3 4 4 0 1 1 1 0 
3 2 1 4 5 4 0 1  1 1 1 
3 2 1 5 6 4 0 1  1 0 1 
3 2 1 6 7 4 0 1  1 0 1 
3 2 1 7 8 4 0 1  1 0 1 
3 2 1 8 1  4 0 1  1 1 0 
3 3 1 1 3  3 0 1  3 1 1 1 0 1 0 
3 3 1 2 4 3 0 1  3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 3 1 3 5 3 0 1  3 0 0 0 0 0 0  
3 3 1 4 6 3 0 1  3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 3 1 5 7 3 0 1  3 0 1 0 1 0 0 
3 3 1 6 8 3 0 1  3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 3 1 7 1  3 0 1  3 1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 3 1 8 2  3 0 1  3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 4 1 1 4  2 0 0  1 0 0 
3 4 1 2 5 2 0 0  1 0 1 
3 4 1 3 6 2 0 0  1 0 1 
3 4 1 4 7  2 0 0  1 0 1 
3 4 1 5 8 2 0 0  1 1 1 
3 4 1 6 1  2 0 0  1 1 1 
3 4 1 7 2 2 0 0  1 1 1 
3 4 1 8 3  2 D O 1 0 1  
3 5 1 1 5 1 0 0  14 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 5 1 2 6 1 0 0  14 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 5 1 3 7  1 0 0 14 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
3 5 1 4 8  1 0 0 14 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
3 5 1 5 1  1 0 0 14 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 l 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
41  
3 5 1 6 2 1 0 0 14 o o o o o 1 o o 1 1  o o .o l 0 . 0 :.0 o�o 1 -0 o 0 .1 1 o 1 1  
3 5 1 7 3 1 0 0 14 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 'O 1 · 0  i · 0 
3 5 1 8 4 1 0 0 14 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
3 6 1 1 6 1 1 0  1 1 1 
3 6 1 2 7  3 4 1  1 1 1 
3 6 1 3 8  2 1 0  1 0 1 
3 6 1 4 1  3 4 1  1 1 1 
3 6 1 5 2  1 2 0 1 1 0 
3 6 1 6 3 1 0 0 1 0 1 
3 6 1 7 4 2 1 0  1 1 0 
3 6 1 8 5 2 1 0  1 0 1 
3 7 1 1 7  1 2 0 13 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1  
3 7 1 2 8 1 2 0 13 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
3 7 1 3 1  2 1 0  13 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 t) 1 0 1 0' 1 1 1
3 7 1 4 2  1 1 0  13 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 7 1 5 3 2 2 0  13 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
3 7 1 6 4 2 0 0  13 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 7 1 7 5 3 3 1 13 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0  
3 7 1 8 6 1 2 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1  
3 8 1 1 8 3 3 1  1 1 1 
3 8 1 2 1 3 3 1  1 1 0 
3 8 1 3 2  1 1 0 1 1 0 
3 8 1 4 3 3 3 1  1 1 0 
3 8 1 5 4  1 1 0  1 0 1 
3 8 1 6 5 4 0 1  1 1 1 
3 8 1 7 6 1 1 0 1 1 0 
3 8 1 8 7  2 1 0  1 1 0 
3 9 1 1 1  2 1 0  1 1  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 9 1 2 2 4 4 1  1 1  1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 9 1 3 3 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0  
3 9 1 4 4  3 3 1  1 1  1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 9 1 5 5 1 2 0 1 1  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
3 9 1 6 6  1 0 0 1 1  0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 9 1 7 7 1 1 0  1 1  1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
3 9 1 8 8  3 3 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 1 0 1 1 2  1 1 0  8 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 1 0 1 2 3 1 2 0 8 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  
3 1 0 1 3 4 1 2 0 8 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  
3 1 0 1 4 5  1 1 0 8 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
3 10 1 5 6 3 3 1  8 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
3 10 1 6 7  1 0 0 8 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 10 1 7 8 1 1 0  8 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
3 10 1 8 1  1 1 0 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0  7 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1  7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 1 1 1 3 3  1 1 0 7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 1 1 1 4 4 2 2 0  7 0 1 1 1 0 L 0 .1,0..1 .0..l D..1 
3 1 1 1 5 5  1 0 0 7 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 1 1 1 6 6 1 2 0 7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 1 1 1 7 7 3 3 1  7 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
3 1 1 1 8 8 1 2 0 7 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3 12 1 1 2 1 2 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 · 1  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
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0 1 0 1 0 1 O .l 0 1 0 1 1 1 O-l n J .0 -1 0 1  0 .1 -0 l 
3 12  1 2 3 1 1  0 28 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 o 1 ·o 1 o 1 o 1 o 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 1 2  1 3 4 1 1  0 28 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 12  1 4 5 2 2 0 28 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
3 1 2  1 5 6 1 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1  
3 12  1 6 7 4 3 1 28 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
3 12  1 7 8 1 1 0 28 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 12  1 8 1 4 4 1 28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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